Custody Involving a Non-Parent: The Rights of Step-Parents Under the De Facto and Psychological Parent Doctrines by Sieber, Katie
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Student Scholarship
2016
Custody Involving a Non-Parent: The Rights of
Step-Parents Under the De Facto and Psychological
Parent Doctrines
Katie Sieber
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Katie Sieber, Custody Involving a Non-Parent: The Rights of Step-Parents Under the De Facto and Psychological Parent Doctrines (2016),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/266
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Custody Involving a Non-Parent: The Rights of Step-Parents Under the De Facto and 
Psychological Parent Doctrines 
by 
Katie Sieber 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the  
King Scholar Program 
Michigan State University College of Law 
under the direction of  
Professor Melanie Jacobs 
Spring, 2016 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1993, Michael Holt and Laurie Holt began a romantic relationship and had a son; 
C.H.
1
 The couple separated three years after the child was born, without ever having married.
2
 
Shortly after the breakup, Laurie Holt became engaged to another man, who died while she was 
pregnant with his son; B.M.H.
3
 Following her fiancé’s death, Laurie Holt resumed her 
relationship with Michael Holt, while still pregnant with B.M.H.
4
 Throughout her pregnancy, 
Michael Holt provided Ms. Holt with emotional support and was present at B.M.H.’s birth.5 The 
couple married after B.M.H. was born in 1999, but divorced in 2001.
6
  
 During the divorce, the couple created a parenting plan giving Mr. Holt parenting time 
every other weekend with his biological son; C.H.
7
 Although B.M.H. was not included in the 
parenting plan, he followed the same visitation schedule as his brother; C.H.
8
 During this time, 
Mr. Holt played an active role in B.M.H.’s life and treated the child as if he were his own son.9 
Ms. Holt changed B.M.H.’s last name from his biological father’s last name to Holt’s last name 
and discussed Mr. Holt adopting the child.
10
 However, the parties chose not to have Mr. Holt 
adopt B.M.H. because adoption would affect the child’s survivorship benefits, which he received 
following his biological father’s death.11 This visitation arrangement continued for eight years 
                                                          
1 In Re Custody of B.M.H., 179 Wash. 2d 224, 229 (2013). 
2 Id. at 229-30. 
3 Id. at 230. 
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 232. Mr. Holt submitted declarations from co-workers stating that “[o]ver the 10 years I have known [B.M.H.], Michael 
has never treated him any differently than any of his other children. [B.M.H.] is as loved and as nurtured as his brother [C.H.] . . . 
. I can say state unequivocally that [B.M.H.] sees Michael as his one and only father and he is as loved and bonded with Michael 
as any boy to his father.” Id.  
10 Id. at 230. 
11 
Id.  
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until the child was ten years old.
12
 During that time, Mr. Holt and B.M.H developed a strong 
bond and considered themselves to have a parent-child relationship.
13
 In 2009, Ms. Holt planned 
to move B.M.H. to a new home with her boyfriend, located over 50 miles away.
14
 After learning 
this information, Mr. Holt filed a petition for non-parental custody of the child.
15
 
 Mr. Holt brought the non-parental custody petition under a Washington statute, which 
allows third parties to seek custody of a child in cases where the legal parent is unfit or where 
placement with a fit parent will harm the child.
16
 In this case, Mr. Holt did not allege that the 
child’s mother was unfit, but argued that neither parent was a suitable custodian for the child 
because the mother planned to move the child into an unstable situation with her new boyfriend, 
and the child’s biological father died.17 The Court found that there were not sufficient 
extraordinary circumstances present to allow the state to interfere with the legal parent’s rights.18 
The court ultimately denied Holt custody of B.M.H. under the Washington third party custody 
statute.
19
 
 This case illustrates how difficult it can be for a step-parent to obtain custody under a 
third party statute and shows the unjust outcomes that often result when the court does not 
consider if the step-parent is the child’s de facto or psychological parent. Courts impose a high 
burden on step-parents by requiring them to show extraordinary circumstances or that the legal 
                                                          
12 Id.  
13 See id. at 231 (“Holt alleged that ‘[Ms. Holt] held [him] out as the child's father in all respects’; that he and B.M.H. are 
‘extremely bonded’; and that ‘[B.M.H.] refers to [him] as his father.’”) 
14 Id. at 230. 
15 Id. at 231.  
16 See RCW 26.10.032 (stating that “a [third] party seeking a custody order shall submit, along with his or her motion, an 
affidavit declaring that the child is not in the physical custody of one of its parents or that neither parent is a suitable custodian 
and setting forth facts supporting the requested order.”) See also In re Custody of Shields, 157 Wash. 2d 126, 142-43 (2006) 
(holding that “parental rights may be outweighed when a parent is unfit. . . . [or] when actual detriment to the child’s growth and 
development would result from placement with an otherwise fit parent.”) 
17 B.M.H., 179 Wash. 2d at 237. 
18 Id. at 239 (“The concern that Ms. Holt might interfere with Mr. Holt and B.M.H.'s relationship is insufficient to show actual 
detriment under Shields and to meet the burden of production for adequate cause under E.A.T.W.”) 
19 Id. at 239.  
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parent is unfit.
20
 The court’s holding in In Re B.M.H. demonstrates how traditional third party 
custody statutes are not always sufficient to ensure that children maintain their relationships with 
parental figures in their lives and shows the need for the psychological parent or de facto parent 
doctrine.
21
 Washington State is progressive and recognizes a de facto parent status, which allows 
for a third party, like Holt, to obtain custody of a minor child if the party meets a number of 
factors and if it is in the child’s best interests.22 However, the court remanded the issue of 
whether Holt achieved that status to the lower court in this case.
23
 Other states have adopted 
similar tests using either the term “psychological parent” or “de facto parent” with slight 
variations in the elements that a party must meet to achieve the status and further variations in 
whether parties who attain the status automatically overcome the parental presumption or 
whether the party must still show compelling circumstances exist before overcoming the parental 
presumption.
24
 However, many states refuse to acknowledge any type of de facto parent status or 
psychological parent status, leaving many step-parents without any legal recourse.
25
  
 In step-parent custody cases, the current system presumes that a parent acts in the child’s 
best interests,
26
 and many states do not allow the court to consider giving custody to a step-
parent without overcoming this parental presumption by showing that the legal parent is unfit or 
that there are extraordinary circumstances present.
27
 With so many non-traditional families, this 
heavy burden is highly detrimental to children in many cases where a step-parent has attained the 
                                                          
20 See In re Custody of S.C.D.-L., 170 Wash. 2d 513, 516-17(2010) (finding that facts that support a finding that non parental 
custody is in the child’s best interest are not sufficient to place the child in custody of the non-parent because the best interest 
analysis does not apply to non-parental custody cases). 
21 See infra Section III.A.  
22 In Re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash. 2d 679, 706-07 (2005).  
23 B.M.H., 179 Wash. 2d at 245. 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 See Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997); see also Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568 (Mich. 1992). 
26 See infra Section I.A. 
27 See e.g., B.M.H., 179 Wash. 2d at 239.  
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role of parent in the child’s mind.28 While it is important to protect the rights of parents regarding 
their children, a uniform approach that allows for step-parents to obtain de facto or psychological 
parent status, overcoming the parental presumption by achieving this status and placing the party 
in legal parity to the legal party, and then relies on the best interests of the child standard to 
determine custody, protects both legal parents’ and children’s rights.29 
 Part I of this paper discusses the legal background of parental rights, non-parental 
custody law in relation to step-parents, and the emergence of the psychological parent doctrine 
and the de facto parent doctrine.
30
 Part II discusses current state approaches regarding step-parent 
custody cases.
31
 Part III analyzes the differing approaches, the effect of each approach on the 
well-being of the child and the effect on the legal parent’s right to custody of the child.32 Part IV, 
finally, offers a proposal to award custody to step-parents and argues that states should adopt the 
psychological parent doctrine as set out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In Re Custody of 
H.S.H-K and then assess the best interests of the child in non-parental custody cases.
33
  
I. RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND STEP-PARENTS 
 
The United States Supreme Court deems fundamental the constitutional right of parents 
to the care, custody, and management of their children.
34
 The Court has long recognized legal 
parents’ rights concerning their children and has protected parents from state intervention in 
raising their children.
35
 The Supreme Court uses this fundamental right to protect the parents 
against the teaching of foreign languages in schools,
36
 requiring students to attend public 
                                                          
28
 Gretchen Livingston, Fewer than Half of U.S. Kids Today Live in a “Traditional” Family, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 22, 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/22/less-than-half-of-u-s-kids-today-live-in-a-traditional-family/. 
29 See infra Part IV. 
30
 See infra Part I.   
31 See infra Part II.  
32 See infra Part III. 
33 See infra Part IV.  
34 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
35 See infra Section I.A. 
36 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397. 
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schools,
37
 and requiring a student to attend school until a certain age.
38
 However, the Supreme 
Court has not applied this right to step-parents in any context because step-parents are commonly 
considered legal strangers to the child.
39
 Whereas a legal parent is granted rights over the child 
including the ability to obtain custody,
40
 a legal stranger has no legal standing to seek custody of 
the child.
41
 While nearly all states have some type of third party custody statute
42
 allowing the 
step-parent to obtain custody of the child, these statutes often require the step-parent to show that 
the legal parent is unfit or that there are extraordinary circumstances before the court will allow 
the party to overcome the parental presumption and grant custody.
43
 Courts created the 
psychological or de facto parent doctrines as a way to provide an avenue for step-parents and 
other third parties to have standing in cases that the legislature did not contemplate.
44
  
A. Fundamental Rights of Parents 
 
The United States Supreme Court began developing parental rights as fundamental 
constitutional rights in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska.
45
 In that case, the Court struck down a 
statute that did not allow schools to teach foreign languages to students below the eighth grade.
46
 
In holding this statute impermissible, the Court explained that it interfered with the parent’s 
                                                          
37 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
38 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
39 Matthew T. Moore, Long-Term Plans for LGBT Floridians: Special Concerns and Suggestions to Avoid Legal and Family 
Interference, 34 NOVA L. REV. 255, 262 (2009) (defining legal stranger as “someone with no standing to bring suit.”) 
40 See Monica K. Miller, How Judges Decide Whether Social Parents Have Parental Rights: A Five-Factor Typology, 49 FAM. 
CT. REV. 72, 72-73 (2011); see also Jennifer Sroka, A Mother Yesterday, but Not Today: Deficiencies of the Uniform Parentage 
Act for Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Relationships, 47 VAL. U.L. REV. 537, 541 n.23 (2012) (“[P]roviding the social 
parent with legal parental status is beneficial in providing security to the family situation, such as the ability to handle medical 
situations or estate issues. By being defined as a legal parent, an individual is granted rights over her child that are otherwise 
unavailable, such as the ability to obtain custody or to make medical decisions.”) 
41 See Moore, supra note 39. 
42 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Children, Kin, and Court: Designing Third Party Custody Policy to Protect Children, Third Parties, and 
Parents, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. POL’Y 43, 73 (2008). 
43 Id.  
44 See B.M.H., 179 Wash. 2d at 240 (“De facto parentage is a flexible equitable remedy that complements legislative enactments 
where parent-child relationships arise in ways that are not contemplated in the statutory scheme.”) 
45 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
46 Id. at 397. 
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fundamental right to control the education of his child.
47
 The Fourteenth Amendment provides 
the liberty to establish a home and to bring up children.
48
 While the Court did not specify what 
the right entails, Meyer is viewed as the origin of parental rights as fundamental rights.
49
 
 The United States Supreme Court next addressed the issue of a parent’s fundamental 
rights in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.
50
 In that case, the Court reaffirmed the liberty of parents 
to direct the upbringing and the education of their children.
51
 The Court explained that “[t]he 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”52 
This decision invalidated an Oregon state statute that eliminated the option of private education 
for students holding that it violated a parent’s fundamental right of choice regarding his child’s 
education.
53
  
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed the parental fundamental rights 
recognized in these early decisions.
54
 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that a state statute 
requiring students to attend high school until the age of sixteen was not constitutional because it 
violated the Amish parents’ rights to the care, custody, and upbringing of their children.55 The 
court again cited to its earlier holdings in both Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of the 
Sisters regarding the fundamental rights of parents in finding the statute unconstitutional.
56
 
                                                          
47 Id. at 401. 
48 Id. at 399. 
49 Id. (“While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much 
consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated.”) 
50
 268 U.S. 390 (1923). 
51 Id. at 534. 
52 Id. at 535. 
53 Id. at 534-35. 
54
 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
55 406 U.S. at 232-33 (“[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”) 
56 Id. at 232. 
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These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court recognizes that legal parents are entitled to 
a large degree of privacy and autonomy regarding their children.
57
  State law presumes that legal 
parents act in the best interest of their children.
58
 However, the Supreme Court has not clearly 
defined the limits of a parent’s fundamental right or the limits of the parental presumption in 
relation to third parties.  
B.  Troxel v. Granville 
  
The Supreme Court addressed third party visitation statutes in Troxel v. Granville, but did 
not state clear standards for when a third party may overcome the parental presumption.
59
 In 
Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court ruled on a Washington state statute that 
allowed for interested third parties to seek visitation of a child.
60
 The statute allowed for “any 
person” to petition the court for visitation rights at “any time” and allowed the court to grant that 
visitation whenever it was in the best interests of the child.
61
 The Washington Supreme Court 
held that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with legal parents’ rights to rear their children.62  
In Troxel, Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married, but had two children, 
Isabelle and Natalie.
63
 After the couple separated, Brad moved in with his parents and brought 
his daughters to his parents’ home each weekend for visitation.64 This arrangement continued for 
two years until Brad committed suicide.
65
 Following his death, the children continued to see their 
grandparents, the Troxels, regularly for visitation.
66
 The children’s mother wanted to limit their 
                                                          
57 See Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple 
Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 314 (2007). 
58 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
59 Id. at 73. 
60 Id. at 60. 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
8 
 
visitation with their grandparents to one visit each month,
67
 while the grandparents wanted 
visitation with the children two weekends each month and two weeks during the summer.
68
 The 
Troxel’s petitioned under the Washington Statute seeking greater visitation with their 
granddaughters.
69
  
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court again recognized the fundamental rights 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children, explaining that it is “perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this court.”70 The Court explained that 
the Washington Statute at issue in Troxel was “breathtakingly broad,” and that a combination of 
factors demonstrated that the visitation order at issue in this case was an unconstitutional 
infringement of the mother’s parental rights to her daughters.71 It noted that the case did not 
present any special circumstances that justified interference with the fundamental right of the 
legal parent.
72
 While the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to the 
Troxels, it did not declare that the Washington Statute was unconstitutional for failing to require 
a party to show harm to the child.
73
 Instead, the Court discussed how the Washington trial court 
judge did not give any weight to the parental presumption, but instead applied the opposite 
presumption, that children should spend time with their grandparents.
74
 The Supreme Court held 
that the Washington Statute as applied to this particular set of facts was unconstitutional.
75
 
                                                          
67 Id. at 61. 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 65. 
71 Id. at 67-68 (“[T]his case involves a visitation petition filed by grandparents soon after the death of their son—the father of 
Isabelle and Natalie—but the combination of several factors here compels our conclusion that § 26.10.160(3), as applied, 
exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause.”) 
72 Id. at 68. 
73 Id. at 73. 
74 Id. at 58. The Supreme Court emphasized the trial judges reasoning for granting visitation did not consider the parental 
presumption. (“I look back on some personal experiences. . . . We always spen[t] as kids a week with one set of grandparents and 
another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe 
that can, in this family, if that is how it works out.”) Id. at 72. 
75 Id. at 73. 
9 
 
However, the Court’s decision in this case was limited and did not answer whether all 
non-parental visitation statutes require a party to show potential harm to the child before granting 
visitation.
76
 This decision left states with little guidance as to the specific parameters required to 
allow third party visitation or custody.
77
 In his dissent, Justice Stevens discussed how although 
the Supreme Court has never before addressed the issue, based on precedent, there is an extreme 
likelihood that a child has a right to maintain intimate relationships.
78
 Justice Stevens 
emphasized that the Court should not create a constitutional rule allowing legal parents to 
arbitrarily exercise their liberty interest in the care of their children because of the wide variety 
of family relationships that may arise.
79
 He recognized that circumstances may arise where a 
child has a strong interest in maintaining a relationship with a third party, and a legal parent’s 
decision to prevent visitation is not motivated by the best interests of the child.
80
 In these 
circumstances, courts should be allowed to intervene on behalf of the child. 
Following Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court left states with little guidance 
regarding the requirements or limitations for third party visitation and custody statutes.
81
 Some 
states responded to the Supreme Court holding by modifying their third party statutes to provide 
more explicit protections for a legal parent.
82
 Several states responded by creating a heightened 
                                                          
76 Id. at 73. (“Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of § 26.10.160(3) and the application of that broad, unlimited 
power in this case, we do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Court—
whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the 
child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.”) 
77
 See Atkinson, infra note 82. 
78 Id. at 88-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This is not, of course, to suggest that a child's liberty interest in maintaining contact with 
a particular individual is to be treated invariably as on a par with that child's parents' contrary interests. we should recognize that 
there may be circumstances in which a child has a stronger interest at stake than mere protection from serious harm caused by the 
termination of visitation by a "person" other than a parent.”)  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 91.  
81
 Id. 
82 Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47.1 FAMILY 
LAW QUARTERLY 1 (2013). 
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clear and convincing evidence
83
 or compelling reasons
84
 standard of proof for third parties 
seeking custody, while others created additional standing for third parties by allowing parties to 
establish de facto or psychological parent status.
85
  
C. The Emergence of the Psychological Parent Doctrine 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, legal scholars began discussing the Psychological Parent 
Doctrine.
86
 Scholars explained that biological events do not create a parent-child relationship, but 
instead the psychological relationships that children develop create this relationship.
87
 Goldstein, 
Freud, and Solnit developed a proposal to change the law and practices governing third party 
custody of children, which they laid out in their work, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.
88
 
The authors believed that this doctrine was necessary because the child’s attachment to a parent 
is not the direct result of his birth.
89
 It instead results from the day to day attention to the child’s 
physical and emotional needs.
90
 They explained that an absent biological parent will not achieve 
this status with the child, but a present non-biological parent may.
91
  
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit proposed a framework where courts make child custody 
decisions based primarily on the child’s bonds with their legal parent or psychological parent.92 
Over time, Courts began to recognize the importance of giving weight to a child’s emotional 
                                                          
83 See, e.g., Mch. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.25(1) (West 2013); Mont. Code § 40-4228(2) (2013); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-60 
(2013); Utah Code Ann. § 30-5a-103(2) (2013). See also Clark v. Wade, 544 S.E.2d 99, 108 (Ga. 2001); In re R.A., 891 A.2d 
564, 579 (N.H. 2005); David N. v. Jason N" 608 S.E.2d 751, 753 (N.C. 2005). 
84 See, e.g., In re Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 63 (Or. 1987); In re Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1996). 
85 See infra Part II.  
86 See Note, Alternative to Parental Right in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L. J. 151 (1963). This 
article is often credited with being the first discussion of the doctrine within legal scholarship. See Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a 
Book Out ...”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1543 (1987). 
87 Note, Supra note 86 at 151.   
88 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973) (Defining a psychological parent relationship 
as based upon “day to day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences.”) 
89 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40 (1979). 
90 Id. 
91 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 89 at 19. 
92 Davis, supra note 86 at 1545. (citing GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 89 at 189). 
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attachments, especially in cases where a legal parent had neglected their duties to the child.
93
 A 
number of state courts adopted either the psychological parent doctrine or the de facto parent 
doctrine in recognition of a child’s attachment to other parties including step-parents.94  
D. The De Facto Parent Doctrine 
 
The De Facto Parent Doctrine is very similar to the psychological parent doctrine. Some 
state courts use the terms interchangeably.
95
 The doctrine focuses on the relationship that the 
child develops with a third party and looks at whether the party lives in the same home as the 
child, providing basic care giving functions.
96
 The differences between the de facto parent and 
psychological parent doctrines are slight and vary from state to state, but each doctrine focuses 
on the same issue: whether a child has developed a parent-child bond with a third party.
97
 
The American Law Institute developed different categories for a parent, including a de 
facto parent, which some courts have referenced in their decisions.
98
 Under the American Law 
Institute definition, a de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by 
estoppel, who has lived with the child for more than two years, has formed a parent-child 
relationship, and regularly performed a share of caretaking functions as much as a parent who 
lived with the child would.
99
 De facto parents have standing to seek custody of the child, but 
                                                          
93 See Phillip F. Schuster, Constitutional and Family Law Implications of the Sleeper and Troxel Cases: A Denouement For 
Oregon’s Psychological Parent Statute?, 36 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 549, 577 (2000). (“At least in a closely-
knit stepparent household, the delicate interplay between the psychological parent's ‘opportunity interest’ and the child's 
emotional and physical needs may form the basis for the psychological parent's substantive custodial claim. This claim, in turn, 
interrelates ultimately with the child's best interest, at least where the noncustodial biological parent has abrogated his or her 
parental responsibilities.”) 
94
 See infra Part II.  
95 See L.B., 155 Wash 2d at 706 (adopting the test from In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. as a test to establish that the party is a de facto 
parent); but see Middleton v. Johnson, 369 S.C. 585 (2006) (adopting the same test from In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. in to 
establish that a party is a psychological parent).  
96 Nicole M. Onorato, Note, The Right to Be Heard: Incorporating the Needs and Interests of Children of Nonmarital Families 
into the Visitation Rights Dialogue, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 491, 522 (2005). 
97 See infra Part II; see also Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Definitions §2.03 (2002). 
98 See In re R.A., 891 A.2d 564 (N.H. 2005); see also L.B., 155 Wash 2d at 706. 
99 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Definitions §2.03 (2002). 
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unlike psychological parents, they do not automatically overcome the parental presumption and 
therefore, are not placed in parity with the legal parent.
100
 Instead, the court is instructed not to 
allocate custodial responsibility to a de facto parent when the legal parent is fit and willing to 
care for the child unless the party can show that the legal parent has not taken on a reasonable 
degree of parenting functions or that the child will be harmed if placed with the fit parent.
101
 
State courts vary on the elements required to establish psychological parent status and on 
whether a party must show additional circumstances to overcome the parental presumption. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that legal parents have fundamental 
rights concerning their children, but the extent of those rights in relation to third parties is not 
clear. This lack of clarity has resulted in many states having third party custody statutes allowing 
parties to overcome the parental presumption in cases with compelling circumstances. Others 
adopted the psychological parent doctrine or de facto parent doctrine to give third parties rights 
more extensive rights. Some states have adopted these doctrines with varying elements, while 
others have rejected the doctrines entirely.   
II. DIFFERING STATE APPROACHES TO STEP-PARENT CUSTODY 
 
State Courts take varying approaches to the legal rights of step-parents. Some courts have 
adopted the psychological parent doctrine and consider parties who achieve the status to have 
overcome the parental presumption, placing these parties in parity with a legal parent.
102
 Other 
states have adopted the doctrine, but only allow the party to overcome the presumption if 
                                                          
100 See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Allocations of Responsibility to Individuals Other than Legal Parents, §2.18 
(2002). 
101 Id.  
102 See Subsection II.A.1.  
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compelling circumstances are present.
103
 Others have a modified approach which allows for a 
party to become a psychological parent and then assesses a variety of factors, some of which are 
unrelated to parental fitness, to determine if the party can overcome the parent presumption.
104
 
The final approach commonly taken by states is to offer no rights for third parties in cases where 
the legal parent is fit.
105
 While it is important to protect the rights of parents regarding their 
children, it is sometimes in a child’s best interests to allow for third parties who meet certain 
requirements to obtain visitation or custody of a child.
106
 Without these rights, many step-parents 
are left powerless.
107
 
A. States Adopting the Psychological Parent Doctrine  
 
A number of states have adopted the psychological parent doctrine.
108
 Although the doctrine 
is similar in many respects, states have adopted varying tests to determine if a party is a 
psychological parent and have different requirements for the party to meet before overcoming 
the presumption.
109
 Further, states differ in the method of adoption of the doctrine, with many 
state courts creating standing for psychological parents through judicial holdings and others 
creating standing through statutes.  
1.  In Re Custody of H.S.H.-K. 
 
 In In Re Custody of H.S.H.-K., the Wisconsin Supreme Court created the leading judicial 
test for determining whether a step-parent is a psychological parent thereby placing a party in 
                                                          
103 See Subsection II.A.2. 
104 See Subsection II.A.3. 
105 See Section II.B. 
106 See Section III.A. 
107 See e.g., Bowie, 490 N.W.2d 568; Titchenal, 693 A.2d 682. 
108 See Christina Spiezia, In the Courts: State Views on the Psychological Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines, 33 
CHILDRENS’S LEGAL RIGHTS J. 402, 404 (2013) (explaining that 21 states currently allow a party to seek custody under the 
psychological or de facto parent doctrines).  
109 See infra Subsections II.A.1-3. 
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parity with the legal parent.
110
 A number of state courts have cited and adopted this test.
111
 To 
establish the existence of a parent-child relationship, the party must show: 
(1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child;  
 
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;  
 
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant 
responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including 
contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial 
compensation;  
 
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to 
have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in 
nature.
112
 
 
 In addition to the factors listed in the test, the court explained that in order to justify state 
intervention with the legal parent’s relationship with the child, the third party needs to show that 
the legal parent has “substantially interfered” with the third party’s relationship with the child.113 
Parties are also required to show that they sought visitation or custody of the child within a 
reasonable time after the legal parent interfered with their relationship with the child.
114
 After 
proving all of these elements, the psychological parent overcomes the parental presumption and 
the court can look at whether having visitation or custody with the third party is in the best 
interests of the child.
115
 The court cautioned that the proceedings must focus on the children, not 
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the third party because children are subject to as much hostility in these types of cases as they are 
in a divorce proceeding between two legal parents.
116
  
 After a party meets all of the above elements, this approach allows for the court to 
consider whether having visitation or custody with a third party is in the child’s best interests.117 
The psychological parent is placed in parity with the legal parent before the court.
118
 Washington 
State adopted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s test and argued that the test properly balances the 
rights of a legal parent with the rights of the child.
119
 
 In In Re Parentage of L.B., the Washington State Supreme Court adopted the test laid out 
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In Re H.S.H.-K. to allow parties in Washington to establish 
standing as de facto parents.
120
 The court found that once a party is able to establish that they are 
a de facto parent, the party stands in legal parity to the legal parent.
121
 The court explained that 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel did not establish that de facto parent status 
or psychological parent status infringes on the fundamental liberties of a legal parent.
122
 Instead, 
the Court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court in Troxel only disapproved of the 
courts granting of visitation in that case, but did not address the issue of state law determination 
of who may be considered a parent.
123
 The Washington Supreme Court referenced Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Troxel, arguing that courts could, in some circumstances, award visitation or 
custody to a third party.
124
  
                                                          
116 Id.  
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
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120 Id. at 708. 
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122 Id. at 710-11. 
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 The Washington court further reasoned that the test did not create a slippery slope, 
opening the door to too many parties, because nannies, teachers, friends, grandparents, or other 
third parties could not easily attain de facto parent status.
125
 The court explained that there should 
be a high threshold for attaining the status to ensure that the court can only consider those who 
have truly developed a parent-child relationship.
126
 Further, the state would not be interfering for 
a third party in an insular family, but would instead be enforcing the rights of a de facto parent 
that arise because the legal parent consented to and fostered the relationship between the de facto 
parent and the child.
127
 The court recognized that the current statutes in Washington failed to 
account for all of the potential scenarios which could arise within the changing definition of a 
family.
128
 It explained that when the rights and interests of children are at stake, the court must 
be especially aware that the legislature’s silence does not leave a party without redress under the 
common law.
129
 While many courts have adopted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s test for 
psychological parents outright, others have created a modified version of the test allowing 
psychological parents to overcome the parental presumption only in cases with compelling 
circumstances.
130
  
2.  States Requiring Compelling Circumstances 
 
 The South Carolina Court of Appeals has adopted the test from In Re Custody of H.S.H.-
K., but does not place the psychological parent in parity with the legal parent.
131
 Instead, the 
court requires the party to show compelling circumstances before it will consider awarding 
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custody to the psychological parent.
132
 In Middleton v. Johnson, the South Carolina Court of 
Appeals heard a case involving a stepfather seeking custody of a child who he had helped raise 
and had a relationship with since the child was born.
133
 The South Carolina Court of Appeals 
adopted the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s test from In Re Custody of H.S.H.-K. explaining that it 
provides a strong framework and ensures that the factors strictly limit a party’s ability to attain 
the status.
134
  
 The court explained that the first factor recognizes that in cases where a legal parent has 
encouraged and fostered a relationship between a third party and the child, that parent has 
reduced his right to unilaterally severe that relationship.
135
 The factor provides legal parents with 
control over who will be allowed to become a psychological parent.
136
 The court explained that 
the right of a legal parent does not allow for that parent to erase a relationship between the child 
and the third party.
137
 While the court recognized that parents have a right to privacy in raising 
their children, it stated that legal parents cannot maintain that complete zone of privacy when 
they invite a third party to function as a parent of the child.
138
 The South Carolina Court of 
Appeals argued that the second prong of the test should allow for parties who have both lived in 
the same home as the legal parent and parties who have supervised the child at their home in a 
custody-like arrangement to meet the prong.
139
 
 The court reasoned that the final two elements were the most important because they 
focused on the actual relationship between the party and the child.
140
 It explained that legal 
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parents are further protected from claims from various third parties like caretakers, nannies, and 
babysitters because they had to assume the role of caring for the child without expectation of 
financial gain.
141
 The court narrowed the doctrine further by stating  that in cases where there are 
already two legal parents in the child’s life, a third party could never attain the status of 
psychological parent because there is no need for an additional parental figure in the child’s 
life.
142
 Finally, the court recognized the importance of the degree of attachment that the child has 
to the third party as being pivotal in the determination of whether the party is a psychological 
parent.
143
 
 Although the South Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
test, the court explicitly stated that attaining the status of psychological parent does not 
automatically give the party the right to custody of the child.
144
 The court explained that the 
standard the court should apply is whether there are compelling circumstances to overcome the 
presumption that a fit legal parent is acting in the child’s best interests.145 While Wisconsin 
placed the parent in parity with the legal parent’s standing, the South Carolina Court of Appeals 
still required some showing of compelling circumstances to overcome the parental 
presumption.
146
 
3. Adoption of the Psychological Parent Doctrine by Statute 
 
A number of states have adopted the psychological parent doctrine by statute.
147
 The 
Oregon Legislature adopted the psychological parent doctrine by statute in 1985.
148
 Oregon’s 
statute provides a slightly modified approach consisting of varying factors and different 
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considerations upon finding that a party is psychological parent.
149
 The statute provides for a 
step-parent or other third party to show that they have a parent-child relationship, with the 
following differences from the test in In Re Custody of H.S.H.-K.:  
10(a) A Child-parent relationship . . . exists or did exist, in whole or in part, 
within the six months preceding the filing of an action under this section. . . . A 
relationship between a child and a person who is the nonrelated foster parent of 
the child is not a child-parent relationship under this section unless the 
relationship continued over a period exceeding twelve months.
150
   
 
 After establishing that a parent-child relationship exists, the court is allowed to consider a 
number of factors to determine if the party has overcome the parental presumption to grant 
visitation or custody.
151
 In order to grant custody, the court may look at whether  
(1) the legal parent is unwilling or unable to care adequately for the child; (2) The 
petitioner or intervenor is or recently has been the child's primary caretaker; (3) 
Circumstances detrimental to the child exist if relief is denied; (4) The legal 
parent has fostered, encouraged or consented to the relationship between the child 
and the petitioner or intervenor; or (5) the legal parent has unreasonably denied or 
limited contact between the child and the petitioner or intervenor.
152
  
 
 The Oregon statute requires the party to prove slightly different elements than the 
Wisconsin Court.
153
 The statute sets specific time requirements that parties must meet for the 
court to find that they are a psychological parent.
154
 The thresholds are relatively low, but by 
including specific time requirements, courts have slightly less discretion to determine if the party 
and the child have developed a sufficient relationship.
155
 Oregon does not allow a psychological 
parent to automatically overcome the parental presumption, but instead requires that the party 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal parent is not acting in the best interest of 
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the child based on the factors laid out in the statute.
156
 Then when the psychological parent 
overcomes the presumption, the court may consider if custody with the third party is in the best 
interests of the child.
157
 Despite the number of protections that some states provide to legal 
parents while still allowing for third parties to obtain custody in certain circumstances, some 
state courts have refused to adopt the psychological parent doctrine.
158
 
B. State Courts Rejection of the Psychological Parent Doctrine 
 
 
Of the fifty states, only twenty-one states have any type of psychological parent doctrine or 
de facto parent doctrine.
159
 Without any avenue to pursue custody or visitation of a child many 
step-parents and children are left without recourse.
160
 Some states have declined to adopt the 
doctrine because of the lack of legislative action,
161
 while others have rejected it explaining that 
third party claims create a heavy burden for legal parents to bear.
162
  
 In Michigan, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to apply the psychological 
parent doctrine. In Bowie v. Arder, the court recognized that the doctrine existed, but explained 
that is was not in the position to apply the doctrine because the state legislature had not taken any 
action to put it in place.
163
 In 1999, the Michigan Supreme Court again held in Van v. Zahorik 
that policy issues that involved child custody should be handled by the legislature and not the 
                                                          
156 See In re Marriage of Southard, 275 Or. App. 538, 550 (2016). 
157 Id. at 551. 
158 See infra Section II.B. 
159 See Spiezia, supra note 108.   
160 See Section III.A. 
161
 Bowie, 490 N.W.2d 568.  
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courts.
164
 While this court relied on the inaction of the legislature, other courts have expressed 
concerns about the application of the doctrine and the rights of a legal parent.
165
   
 The Vermont Supreme Court rejected the psychological or de facto parent doctrines.
166
 
The court explained that a test for de facto parent status would result in a “full blown evidentiary 
hearing” and would infringe on the constitutional rights of the legal parent.167 The court feared 
that by allowing parties to claim parentage under these doctrines, this would require parents to 
defend against a large number of third parties seeking to establish de facto or psychological 
parent status.
168
 They feared that this test would not prevent legal parents from having to defend 
against the merits of petitions, and stated that the possibilities of who could bring a petition were 
nearly “limitless.”169 The court explained that it feared adopting the doctrine would open the 
door to the possibility of third parties abusing this ability and attempting to harass an individual 
or to continue a relationship that the child did not want.
170
 The court did not view the doctrine as 
a proper balance between the rights of a legal parent and a child, but instead believed that the 
doctrine focused too much on the rights of the third party.
171
 These concerns ultimately lead to 
the court rejecting the doctrine.
172
 
 State Courts take a number of approaches to the psychological parent doctrine.
173
 A 
number of state courts have adopted the leading judicial test from the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.
174
 Other state legislatures have chosen to adopt the doctrine.
175
 While the elements for 
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each test are similar, even after finding that a party meets the test, states put psychological 
parents on different levels in comparison to legal parents by requiring some parties to still show 
compelling circumstances before they can overcome the parental presumption and allowing 
others to automatically overcome the parental presumption.
176
 Other states reject outright the 
psychological parent doctrine leaving step-parents and children with no redress.
177
 This situation 
has clear implications for both the well-being of children involved in these disputes and for the 
legal parent’s fundamental rights.178 Courts must balance these rights to arrive at the best 
outcome for families.  
III. THE EFFECT OF DIFFERING STATE APPROACHES ON CHILDREN IN STEP-PARENT CUSTODY 
DISPUTES 
 
Although traditionally parental rights belonged exclusively to legal parents of children, 
the concept of family has changed dramatically in recent decades.
179
 It is common for families in 
our society to be comprised of people who may not be biologically related to a child, but care for 
the child in the same way that a legal parent would.
180
 In these types of situations it is extremely 
beneficial to the well-being of a child to allow that person to have some rights to the child.
181
 
Psychologists recognize that children form relationships with step-parents that are valuable and 
important to the child’s well-being.182 Courts in the United States are beginning to change their 
interpretations of parentage to fit with more modern views of families, but many states have been 
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slow to made changes to the detriment of both step-parents and children.
183
 While it is important 
to protect a legal parent’s rights, allowing step-parents to attain psychological parent status 
properly balances a parent’s fundamental right with the right of a child to maintain intimate 
relationships.
184
 The decision of whether to allow a step-parent to become a psychological parent 
has implications for both children’s rights to continue their relationships and parents’ 
fundamental rights to the care, control, and custody of their children.
185
  
A. Implications for the Well-Being of the Child 
 
Children in families with nontraditional parents may form attachments to step-parents, and 
the step-parent’s lack of rights is detrimental to the children’s well-being.186 Continuity of 
personal relationships in a child’s life allows them to have healthy growth and development.187 
While a child’s need for continuity changes as they grow, it is clear children benefit from 
stability and maintaining relationships with caregivers.
188
 Those parties who have attained the 
level of a psychological parent or de facto parent have developed strong bonds with the child that 
courts should recognize.
189
 Children who experience divorce often deal with sadness and 
depression if they are not permitted to see their noncustodial parent.
190
 Even though third parties 
are not legal parents, the effect of the loss of a relationship with a third party may be as 
detrimental to the child as the loss of a relationship with a legal parent depending on the 
attachment of the child to that third party.
191
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The implications of a state court’s refusal to allow the psychological parent doctrine are 
widespread.
192
 In the United States, only 46% of children under the age of eighteen live in a 
home with two heterosexual parents in their first marriage.
193
 The number of children living in a 
traditional family has been rapidly declining in recent decades.
194
 The Supreme Court plurality 
recognized this shift in Troxel v. Granville, explaining that “the demographic changes of the past 
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.”195 The Court understood that 
many of these families needed to bring in parties outside of the nuclear family to help with the 
everyday tasks associated with raising a child.
196
 In his dissenting opinion in Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court noted that it is destructive to 
pretend that we agree on the meaning of terms like “family” or “parenthood.”197 He cautioned 
that states should not attempt to compel only one definition of parent because many children’s 
families will not fit within that definition and it will be the child who suffers most.
198
 
 Further, legal parents’ fundamental rights to the care of their children should be balanced 
against children’s needs to maintain their relationships.199 In Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens’ 
language in his dissenting opinion supports that children’s rights to maintain intimate 
relationships should be given consideration along with the legal parent’s rights.200 Justice 
Stevens suggests a statute must consider the parental presumption, but a state should not be 
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prevented from protecting children against a parent’s decision that is not actually motivated by a 
child’s best interests.201 He recognizes that cases will likely arise where a parent is not acting in 
the child’s best interest, and the court should be able to protect the child in those 
circumstances.
202
 Because of the implications for the well-being of children, courts should 
balance a legal parent’s fundamental rights with a child’s need to maintain intimate relationships. 
B. Implications for a Legal Parent’s Fundamental Rights 
While it is clear that a legal parent has a fundamental right to the care, control, and custody 
of their child, it is not clear how far that right extends.
203
 The Supreme Court noted in Troxel v. 
Granville that “the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own 
determination” of a third parties access to visitation with a child.204 In that case, the mother had 
already offered to allow the grandparents visitation with their granddaughters, but the Troxels 
wanted additional visitation.
205
 This case suggests that while in that particular situation the court 
was not permitted to grant visitation in the way that it did, a legal parent’s right to the care of the 
child is not without limits.
206
 The Court recognized that because families vary widely, 
circumstances may arise where visitation would not violate a parent’s right to due process under 
the fourteenth amendment.
207
  
 State courts reasons for adopting the psychological parent doctrine support that the 
doctrine does not ignore a parent’s fundamental right to control and care for their child, but 
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instead balances this right with the child’s rights and the psychological parent’s rights.208 The 
Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue as balancing the rights of a legal parent with the 
rights of a de facto parent.
209
 In In Re Parentage of L.B., the Washington Supreme Court noted 
that the state was not interfering with a legal parent’s fundamental rights, but was instead 
enforcing the rights of the de facto parent that the legal parent created by encouraging and 
fostering a relationship between the child and the third party.
210
 The South Carolina Court of 
Appeals framed the issue as a balance between the rights of a legal parent and the rights of the 
child.
211
 The court explained that because a legal parent allowed for the third party to create a 
relationship with the child, they should not be permitted to unilaterally end that child’s 
relationship with the party.
212
 The court balanced a legal parent’s right to privacy in raising their 
child, with the rights of both the child and the third party to continue their relationship.
213
 
 While the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the extent of legal parents’ fundamental 
right to the care, custody, and control of their children, it is clear that in some cases severing a 
relationship with a party with whom the child has developed  a parent-child bond is detrimental 
to the child’s well-being.214 By requiring a party to meet a number of factors and then allowing 
the court to consider if custody is in the child’s best interests, the legal parent’s fundamental 
rights are properly balanced with the rights of the child and the de facto party to maintain their 
relationship.
215
 Therefore, states should adopt the psychological parent doctrine as set out by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. to allow for parties to petition for 
custody of a child in cases where they have developed a parent-child relationship, overcoming 
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the parental presumption and placing the party in parity with the legal parent, in order to properly 
balance the rights of the legal parent with the rights of children to maintain their relationships.
216
 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFORM APPROACH TO STEP-PARENT CUSTODY CASES 
 
To ensure that children’s and step-parents’ rights to maintain their relationships are 
properly balanced with legal parents’ fundamental rights, states should adopt the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court’s test allowing for psychological parents to obtain custody.217 This serves the 
child’s best interests in families that do not have a traditional structure, while still ensuring that 
the court does not violate a legal parent’s constitutional rights.218 By requiring high standards to 
establish that a person is a psychological parent, only those who have a parent-child relationship 
with the consent of the legal parent will be permitted to be considered for custody or 
visitation.
219
 State courts should adopt the test from the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In Re 
Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
220 and place the psychological parent in parity with a legal parent’s 
standing.
221
 A court can then consider the best interests of the child factors to determine what 
custody and visitation arrangement is in the best interests of the child.
222
  
A. In Re Custody of H.S.H.-K . Test 
 
The test laid out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court properly balances the fundamental 
rights of the legal parent with the rights of the child and the psychological parent to maintain 
their relationship.
223
 First states should require that “(1) the biological or adoptive parent 
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consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like 
relationship with the child.”224 Second, states should require “(2) that the petitioner and the child 
lived together in the same household.”225 Third, states should require “(3) that the petitioner 
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's care, 
education and development, including contributing towards the child's support, without 
expectation of financial compensation.”226 Finally, “(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental 
role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent 
relationship parental in nature.”227 By considering each of these factors, courts will balance the 
rights of the legal parent with the rights of the child and the psychological parent.  
1. Factor One 
 
 First a party must show that “the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, 
the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child.”228 This 
factor recognizes that legal parents should have control over who is allowed to have a 
relationship with their children.
229
 Only those parties who a legal parent chooses to allow to 
establish this type of bond will be able to meet this element.
230
 This factor also recognizes, like 
the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted, that when a legal parent consents to this type of 
relationship with a third party and the child, that parent reduces his right to unilaterally severe 
that relationship.
231
 Further, it protects a child who has formed a strong bond with a third part 
                                                          
224 H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.  
225 Id. 
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228 Id.  
229 See Middleton, 369 S.C. at 597(explaining that the factor provides legal parents with a great degree of control over who is be 
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from the negative effects of severing that relationship.
232
 This creates the proper balance between 
a legal parent’s right to privately raise a child and the right of the child and the psychological 
parent to maintain an intimate relationship because parties will only meet this factor when legal 
parents choose to reduce that zone of privacy by allowing a third party to have a parent-child 
relationship with their children.
233
  
2. Factor Two  
 
 The second factor requires that “the child lived together in the same household with the 
third party.”234 This factor ensures that legal parents have even greater control over who may 
become the psychological parent of their children.
235
 The South Carolina Court of Appeals stated 
that the second prong of the test should allow for parties who have both lived in the same home 
as the legal parent and parties who have supervised the child at their home in a custody-like 
arrangement to meet the prong.
236
 This interpretation supports the intent behind the doctrine 
because if the child has already lived in a custody arrangement with the third party, the child has 
likely formed a psychological bond with that party.
237
 Finally, this factor does not impose any 
specific time requirements on how long party must have lived with the child.  This gives the 
court more discretion to determine whether the parties have formed a parent-child relationship, 
without excluding parties who have developed this relationship in a shorter time than a factor 
with specific time requirements might allow.
238
 This factor balances legal parents’ rights because 
                                                          
232 See Barlett, supra note 186 at 904. 
233
 See Middleton, 369 S.C. at 597. 
234 H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421. 
235 See e.g., B.M.H., 179 Wash. 2d at 230. (Mother sent the child to the step-father’s home  to bond with the child following the 
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they control who the child lives with, but also allows the court to focus on whether a parent-child 
relationship was formed, protecting the rights of the child and the psychological parent. 
3.  Factor Three 
 
 The third factor requires that the petitioner “assumed obligations of parenthood by taking 
significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including contributing 
towards the child's support, without expectation of financial compensation.”239 This factor 
ensures that the party has developed the type of relationship that a legal parent would normally 
have with the child by caring for his day to day needs.
240
 It also addresses many of the concerns 
raised by courts by further limiting who will meet this element of the test.  The Vermont 
Supreme Court expressed concerns with this test becoming a slippery slope because it could 
open the door for anyone, including caregivers and nannies, to seek custody of a child.
241
 
However, because the factor requires that the party has not received any financial compensation, 
both of these types of parties would fail under the test and would not attain psychological parent 
status.
242
   
 The South Carolina Court of Appeals, in adopting this test, explained that in cases where 
there are already two legal parents in the child’s life, a third party could never attain the status of 
psychological parent because there is no need for an additional parental figure in the child’s 
life.
243
 However, this is not the interpretation that aligns with the purpose behind the doctrine.
244
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Because the focus of the doctrine is on whether the person has developed a parent-child 
relationship, the harm to the child would still be the same if he or she is separated from a party 
that the child was bonded with.
245
 Therefore, multiple parents should not automatically be 
excluded by the test; instead the court should determine on a case by case basis if a party meets 
the test and then determine a custody arrangement among all parties with whom the child has a 
parent-child bond.
246
  
4.  Factor Four 
 
 The fourth factor requires the third party to show that “the petitioner has been in a 
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, 
dependent relationship parental in nature.”247 This factor recognizes that a temporary relationship 
does not rise to the level of a psychological parent.
248
 If the party has been in the child’s life for 
only a short period of time, it is less likely that the parent-child relationship has developed, but 
unlike the statute created by the Oregon Legislature, the court still has discretion to determine on 
a case by case basis if the relationship exists.
249
 This factor balances the legal parent’s 
fundamental right with the child’s need to maintain a relationship by allowing the court to 
determine if the relationship existed for a sufficient length of time.  
B. Third Parties in Parity with Legal Parents 
 
Once a party meets the standard for a psychological parent, the court should place the 
party in parity with the legal parent without requiring the party to show compelling 
                                                          
245 See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 190 (explaining that children who are not permitted to see their noncustodial 
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circumstances, that the biological parent is unfit, has abandoned the child, or is going to cause 
harm to the child.
250
 By requiring a stringent standard to achieve psychological parent status, the 
court can only consider those whose loss will have a great detriment to the child.
251
  The court 
must consider what is in the child’s best interest as long as a parent-child relationship has been 
established.
252
 This approach better balances the needs of the child with the rights of the legal 
parent and the psychological parent and ensures that all parties’ interests are protected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In order to protect the best interests of children, all states should permit step-parents to 
obtain the status of a psychological parent. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s test in In Re Custody 
of H.S.H.-K. provides strict standards that only those step-parents or individuals who have 
formed a parent-like relationship with the child are able to meet to become psychological 
parents. Once parties have met those requirements, they should be able to obtain custody if it is 
in the best interests of the child, without a showing that the legal parent is unfit. While this does 
limit the rights of parents, it balances those rights with the child’s rights. Further, the court will 
only balance the legal parent’s rights when the parent has fostered that relationship between the 
step-parent and the child. This would help to ensure that children whose family includes non-
traditional roles would be able to maintain those close relationships with third parties. All state 
courts should adopt the test created by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to consider whether step-
parents have become psychological parents, allow them to overcome the parental presumption 
without showing compelling circumstances, placing them in parity with legal parents, and then 
determine if it is in the child’s best interests to maintain that relationship.  
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